

The Christian News-Letter

Edited by
KATHLEEN
BLISS

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WE PROPOSE IN THIS NEWS-LETTER to give some account of a book which, as has been recognized in diverse quarters, is a significant challenge to much contemporary thinking about politics. The book is by Hans J. Morgenthau, Associate Professor of Political Science in the University of Chicago and is called *Scientific Man versus Power Politics*.¹

Professor Morgenthau's purpose is to call in question as sharply as he can "the dominant and widespread belief in the power of science to solve all problems and, more particularly, all political problems which confront man in the modern age". The book attempts to trace the sources and survey some of the manifestations of this belief, to show that it is misplaced and to call attention to the neglected intellectual and moral faculties of man to which alone the problems of the social world will yield. It bears on its title page the saying of Edmund Burke that "politics ought to be adjusted, not to human reasonings, but to human nature; of which the reason is but a part, and by no means the greater part".

The trouble with modern civilization is, in Professor Morgenthau's view, that men are torn between two irreconcilable attitudes. The one is confidence in the power of reason, as represented by modern science, to solve the social problems of our age; the other is despair at the continually renewed failure of scientific reason to solve them. There is thus an ever-widening

NEWS-LETTER

SCIENCE AND POLITICS

SUPPLEMENT

CHRISTIANITY AND THE
MODERN WORLD VIEW—III

BY
H. A. HODGES

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gap between men's philosophy (by which he says he means "the largely unconscious intellectual assumptions by which the age lives, its basic convictions as to the nature of man and society") and their experience. The two fundamental assumptions of the dominant modern philosophy are, first, that the physical and the social worlds are capable of being understood through the same rational processes, and, secondly, that when they have been thus understood they can be rationally controlled.

What Professor Morgenthau describes as the dominant philosophy of our time is the same as what Professor Hodges in his Supplements means by "the modern world view". Professor Hodges is concerned with the relation of this attitude to the Christian understanding of the world, Professor Morgenthau with its relation to politics. Belief in the ability of the human mind to mould both the physical and the social worlds through increasing knowledge and the application of rational principles, is, says Professor Morgenthau, common ground to men as different in philosophical, economic and political beliefs as Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer and John Dewey. Whatever else may separate the White House from the Kremlin, liberals from conservatives, all share the belief that, if not now, at least ultimately, "politics can be replaced by science, however differently defined".

Inherent in this attitude is the belief that *all problems are in the last resort technical*. The politician must give way to the scientific or technical expert. In place of the statesman we need the social engineer. The book abounds in illustrations of this way of thinking. According to T. G. Masaryk modern democracy does not aim at *rule* at all, but at efficient *administration*. The question of morality, becomes in the hands of John Dewey, "an engineering issue". "If six hundred scientists working together can produce the atom bomb," declared the Chairman of the National Conference of Christians and Jews in the United States, "then six hundred scientists could be put to work on the job of inter-group hatreds" and their combined efforts (he predicted) could end these hatreds within twenty-five years.

The search for a simple, rational principle, applicable to all problems, is peculiarly mischievous in the international field.

In the domestic field, in the last two centuries, the middle classes decided the struggle for power definitely in their own favour : and they could then turn their attention to a wide range of problems which (the problem of the distribution of power being not in question) became technical. Wherever and whenever the distribution of power was challenged, or had not been really settled, forces emerged which reduced technical solutions to futilities. In the international sphere the reduction of political problems to scientific propositions is never possible, for the problem of the distribution of power is never unalterably settled : it is *always* present, and the only means of dealing with it is by political decision.

THE NATURE OF POLITICS

The assumption that all problems are capable of scientific solution has resulted, Professor Morgenthau maintains, in a grave decay of political thinking. The real problems of politics, which have to do with relations of power and restraints on power, have been ignored. Rationalism, as a political philosophy, has misconstrued the nature of politics and mistaken completely the nature of man and of the world. It assumes that man is rational and good. It refuses to see that all human action is attended by evil ; that our best intentions, translated into acts, are wrested by circumstances to bring about results contrary to our purpose ; that the moral demands made on us by society surpass our capacity to meet them, so that we can do good only by neglecting some other good which also has a claim on us.

Everywhere we find the conflict of life with life. All action begins and ends with the self. "Without some element of self-assertion, the self could not survive and would lose its capacity to contribute its measure of unselfishness to meeting the needs of the world. Once the very logic of the ethics of unselfishness has thus put its stamp of approval on selfishness, individual egotisms, all equally legitimate, confront each other ; and the war of every man against every man is on."

The other root of evil is the desire for power. This manifests itself as the desire to maintain the range of one's person in relation to others, to increase it or to demonstrate it. It is

closely related to the selfishness already spoken of, but not identical with it. The typical goals of selfishness—food, shelter and security—are necessary to the survival of the individual. The desire for power, on the other hand, is concerned not with the survival of the individual, but with his position among his fellows. The selfishness of man has limits, his will to power has none.

While non-political action is always liable to corruption by selfishness and the lust for power, this corruption belongs to the very nature of politics, for the essence of politics is the exercise of power over other men. Here the desire for power is not merely blended with dominant aims of a different kind, but is "the very essence of the intention, the very life-blood of the action, the constitutive principle of politics as a distinct sphere of human activity. The evil that corrupts political action is the same evil that corrupts all action, but the corruption of political action is indeed the paradigm and the prototype of all possible corruption".

All this will be familiar to those who read the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr. It is the reassertion of a long tradition in European political thought, going back to St. Augustine, against the neo-pelagianism of modern rationalism.

This view of the nature of politics has close relations not only with the Christian doctrine of original sin, but also with the conception of life as *encounter*, on which emphasis has often been laid in the Christian News-Letter. A genuine understanding of the significance of encounter compels one to believe that the conflicting claims of life upon life cannot be resolved by skilful engineering, but only by ethical decision.

What then is Professor Morgenthau's remedy for the intellectual confusion, moral blindness and political decay which rationalism has brought about? He has none. The error of the rationalist consists precisely in thinking that there is some neat and rational solution round the corner. What Professor Morgenthau sets out to do is to destroy this illusion. Face the realities of politics for what they are, he says, and there is a better chance of your being able to deal with them successfully. Take man in

his wholeness, and do not ignore either his biological impulses or his ethical and spiritual nature, which transcends rational calculation. Realize that conflict of interests is inseparable from human life ; that the fundamental problem of politics is the moralization of relations of power ; that the social task is an unending struggle ; that, as religion teaches, the devil is a permanent and inescapable element in the world. You will then understand that it is not to the technical skill of the social engineer, but to the practical wisdom of the statesman that we must look for the solution of political problems as they arise. You will moderate your expectations. You will concentrate your efforts on the three factors on which political achievement depends—on bringing about social arrangements which limit and contain the selfish tendencies of human nature ; on minimizing the psychological causes of social conflict, such as insecurity and fear ; and on the creation of a moral climate which makes possible an approximation to a tolerable justice.

CHRISTIAN FAITH AND RATIONALISM

What interest has Professor Morgenthau's line of thought for Christians ? In the light of the unfortunate history of the relations between Christianity and science, it may easily be thought that a welcome to Professor Morgenthau's book in a Christian publication is the old game of seizing any stick with which to beat rationalism and science. All too often Christian utterances, such as the treatment of humanism in the Report *Towards the Conversion of England*, give colour to this view. It must, therefore, be said emphatically that the depreciation of reason is not a Christian interest. In an article by Professor Postan in a recent issue of the *Cambridge Journal*,¹ there is a brilliant defence of reason in its rightful place, for which he rightly claims support in the Christian tradition. All the greater rationalists, he maintains, were surprisingly free from the sin of exclusive intellectualism. "Most rationalists are what they are not by virtue of the claims they make for reason, but by virtue of the reasonable arguments which they apply to problems to which reason applies. They ply a rational trade, they do not propound a rationalist metaphysic. Who was it said (I think it was Rathenau)

¹ Vol. I. No. 7, April, 1948. Bowes & Bowes, Cambridge. 3s.

that by sticking to his last a cobbler does not thereby wish to demonstrate that the universe is made of leather?"

MAN AS CREATOR

But even the particular, more limited form of rationalism, against which Professor Morgenthau's attack is directed, i.e. the attempt of man through knowledge to control his environment and shape his own destiny, raises questions from which Christians cannot lightly turn aside. How searching is the challenge they present to the Christian mind is forcibly brought out in a remarkable article entitled "The New Man—the Marxist and the Christian View", in the *Dublin Review* (First Quarter, 1948) by the French Jesuit, Père Lubac.

Our own age, he says, has produced a new ambition. An overwhelming idea has arisen with the strength of some hitherto undiscovered force. Not only external nature, but man himself has become "operative" science, wholly directed to the possession of the world. Here capitalism and socialism find common ground. Man feels himself destined to organize the planet with a view to its maximum production and undertakes to transform the world by his own industry. It is not only nature, but society that he aims to transform. The growing understanding of the mechanisms of behaviour implies the possibility of manipulating it at will.

How ought Christians, Père Lubac asks, to regard these aspirations? Ought we to look on them as a forbidden dream, a demoniacal ambition, a monstrous collective repetition of the crime of Prometheus? Man is a creature, many will remind us; his first duty is to submit to the ordering of Providence. But can it really be maintained that the social universe, as constituted to-day, is the work of the Creator? To work for an improvement of an order of things which has been established mainly through man's own historical activities is not encroaching on Providence. "Man is not placed in the universe as one thing among other things. Nor is he installed there to enjoy it passively as if everything had already been achieved without him. He is created . . . to carry on the work of his Maker. He is not, for weal or woe, installed in a ready-made world; he co-operates in its genesis."

The fable of Prometheus, we must remember is not a biblical story; a revolt against the gods is not necessarily a revolt against God. "Our God is indeed a jealous God, but his jealousy is something far other than that of the gods of the fable. He does not grudge His creatures fire or any other of their discoveries and inventions. On the contrary, it is precisely through these that His dominion is extended and new plans are realized in accordance with His will."

Can we Christianize this Promethean archetype? Can Christianity come to terms with man's capacity to transform his environment? Père Lubac insists that it can and must. Nikolas Berdyaev in almost everything that he wrote in recent years declared this to be the central problem that to-day confronts the Christian Church.

Professor Morgenthau sometimes does less than justice to the body of positive knowledge that has been gained since the beginning of the present century. Sociologists will not be deterred from their task by pointing to the difficulties and uncertainties attending the study of human behaviour. They know that, whatever the mistakes, and however slow the progress, they are acquiring valuable knowledge, much of which can be of immediate practical importance, and for this reason the process of social enquiry goes steadily forward in all countries.

The belief in salvation by knowledge is the most serious rival with which Christianity has to contend in the world to-day. But it is also true that increasing knowledge is achieving results which the Church must incorporate in the fulfilment of its own mission. If it fails to do this it will operate with what Karl Mannheim used to call "home-spun" methods in a world in which expanding knowledge and growing control over environment are being applied to the shaping of human character and behaviour with increasing effect. The new fact with which Christians need to reckon is the multiplying evidence that far larger areas of human life than the purely physical are amenable to treatment by rational understanding and human skill. In its task of redeeming human life the Church has increasingly to seek alliance with social agencies possessing knowledge, experience and resources supplementary to its own.

But even for those who whole-heartedly accept the extension of man's powers as a stage in his growth and their exercise as a legitimate activity, the problems so acutely raised by Professor Morgenthau remain. It is possible for the energies of an age to be so entirely concentrated on the task of shaping man's environment, physical and social, that men lose sight of the fact that in that activity their whole being cannot find expression. The result is that human life becomes narrowed and restricted just when it is thought to be undergoing an indefinite expansion. Few things are more deserving of attention at the present time than Professor Morgenthau's reminder that the problems of the social world are fundamentally different from those of the physical, and his exposure of the myth that they can be solved by methods of social engineering. It is on the negative task of showing the falsity of widely accepted assumptions that his efforts are mainly concentrated, and that is enough to expect from one volume. But it is easy to see how close is the connection of what he is saying with two great conceptions that are coming more and more to occupy the central place in Christian thinking about the contemporary world. The one is the uniqueness and preciousness of personal existence, the hidden forces of personal response, which tend to be forgotten in large-scale plans of social engineering, and are continually in danger of being crushed by institutions. The other is that the mystery and depth of man's being can be understood only in relation to a transcendent spiritual world, and that when his attention is concentrated exclusively on mastery of the external world, there takes place inevitably a decay and loss of spiritual substance. The Church has a mission of incalculable importance in recalling men's minds to these vital truths, but the mission cannot be fulfilled without a greatly enlarged understanding of the "new man" who is coming into existence, and who is vividly brought to our attention in the article by Père Lubac.

Kathleen Bliss

P.S. The C.N.L. needs a manager for its subscription department. The work includes careful keeping of records and the answering of many enquiries. Typing essential.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE MODERN WORLD VIEW—III

By H. A. HODGES

PHILOSOPHY AND THE GOD OF ABRAHAM

My last Supplement ended by formulating the “Abrahamic presupposition” on which Christian thinking is based. This presupposition in its proper form plays no part in the history of philosophy, and only a limited part in the history of religion itself. It is in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Mazdeism that it shows itself most effectively. In the religions of the Far East, and in the philosophies alike of east and west, another principle is seen at work, which may be described as the Abrahamic presupposition *depersonalized*. It retains the idea of purpose at work in nature and history, and it agrees that man can in some degree come to know the cosmic purpose and find his happiness in acting concordantly with it; but it leaves out the element of personal confrontation between God and individual human beings, and explicit communication from God to them, which is contained in Abrahamic theism.

THE METAPHYSICAL PRESUPPOSITION

The principle, so depersonalized, might be formulated thus : THAT THE UNIVERSE IS GOVERNED BY A PURPOSE TO WHOSE NATURE OUR OWN HIGHEST INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL ASPIRATIONS PROVIDE A CLUE. This principle I call THE METAPHYSICAL PRESUPPOSITION.

This presupposition is what Hegel meant by saying that the real is the “rational” and the “rational” is the real. It has often been used since his time as the basis of an argument for the existence of God on the ground that the world must be assumed to be “rational”, and that a world without God is “meaningless” or does not ultimately “make sense”. But the word “rational” is ambiguous. It may mean “purposive”, and imply all that the metaphysical presupposition asserts; or

it may merely mean "knowable", which implies not the metaphysical presupposition, but the scientific. And there is an equivocation in a certain kind of Christian apologetics, which begins with the proposition that the world is "rational" in the scientific sense, and slides unconsciously into assuming that it is also "rational" in the sense of the metaphysical presupposition. The second does not follow from the first, and it was one of Kant's services to philosophy to point this out. If we are going to assume the metaphysical presupposition, we had better be explicit about it, and not try to extract it from the principles of science.

The two presuppositions were clearly distinguished by Plato when he wrote the *Phaedo*. He paints a picture of Socrates becoming dissatisfied with a philosophy which is merely physics, and calling for an account of the universe which shall be based on "the binding force of good". Here is the birth of Platonism and of the whole classical tradition in European philosophy. But as that tradition developed, even in the hands of its founders, Plato and Aristotle, the two principles originally distinguished were run together into one. The metaphysical presupposition was imported into the foundations of science itself, and we were told that all existence and all process or movement is governed by an inherent purposiveness. If this were so, then the principles of science would contain elements on which an argument for the existence of God could be based, and the classical European tradition contends that this is the case. But I believe that the principles thus imputed to science were alien principles foisted upon it from outside, that they were derived from the metaphysical presupposition, and that their acceptance was one of the causes of the sterility of science for 2,000 years. In modern times they have been detected and dismissed, and the classical equivocation disappears with them. If anyone is going to argue from the metaphysical presupposition to-day, he must do so with full consciousness of what he is doing.

Now, I believe that the typical Christian in his own thinking does not make the metaphysical presupposition. He makes the Abrahamic presupposition which I described in my last Supplement. The metaphysical presupposition is a dim shadow of that,

in the minds of people who are not bold enough to make the full Christian presupposition all in one jump. But I believe that if you start with the metaphysical presupposition, as so many do, and seek the most effective way of applying it to the facts of experience, the most effective way will be found in fact to be Abrahamic theism. And thus those who do not take to it at first may be led to it indirectly. How would the argument run?

PANTHEISM AND THEISM

When the metaphysical presupposition is at work in the mind, conditioning our interpretation of the facts of experience, it may give rise to any one of a number of theories : animatism, polytheism, monotheism, panpsychism, pantheism, philosophical idealism. These theories are not all equally deserving of consideration. There is in human thinking a persistent tendency to seek simplicity and to reduce the welter of facts in the world to a unity. By virtue of this tendency, the many gods or spirits of primitive belief tend to disappear, or at least to be brought under a single governing power. The pluralistic theories therefore need not detain us, and I shall group all remaining theories under the two heads of pantheism and theism ; pantheism for this purpose is to include idealist philosophies of the classic post-Kantian type. These two theories differ only in the point where they place the purpose which is held to govern nature. Pantheism places it in nature itself, which is taken to be a consciously or unconsciously purposive whole ; theism places it in a conscious being distinct from nature.

By what methods can we decide between these rival views ?
(i) Not by direct observation. The God of theism is not open to observation, and while the God of pantheism is so, He does not look like what the theory says He is. (ii) Not indirectly by the test of consequences, as scientific hypotheses are established ; for (at the present stage in the argument) there are no consequences in the field of observable fact which would follow from one of the rival theories and not from the other. (iii) There is then no test left to us but the formal one which is used in philosophical speculation, of showing that a theory, while coherent and reasonable in itself, colligates all the known facts in the manner laid down by the governing presupposition. This

test appears weak at first sight, especially in view of the age-long confusion in speculative philosophy. But I think it could be shown that this confusion is due to the philosophers not having been in earnest with the metaphysical presupposition, some of them not having held it at all, and others having tried to blend it with the scientific presupposition as I have already explained. I think also that, if we are really in earnest with it, we shall find that only theism can stand the test, and even theism can do so only if it takes a particular form.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF PANTHEISM

On the ground of coherence and reasonableness, pantheism attracts by its air of simplicity, especially in a world which has learned from science the value of economy in explanation. Where theism needs two entities, God and nature, pantheism makes do with one. To this logical point may be added the aesthetic appeal of a doctrine of one all-embracing Whole, which can be felt at work in some modern philosophers. On further consideration, however, difficulties begin to arise. The world as we see it or as science reveals it is not the divine Whole which pantheism says it is, and so we are driven to say that the divine unity is only one aspect of the world—the deepest and truest aspect, of course—which is hidden from common sense and science, but revealed to poets, worshippers, and philosophers. Yet at the same time the world of common sense and science is not illusory ; it too has to be an aspect of the real. So we must try to hold together two aspects of reality which continually threaten to fuse or to come apart. The empirical universe is always with us, and it is hard to remember that this is not the “Nature” which we are to regard as God. It is equally hard to see what that something more can be, which constitutes the aspect of divine wholeness in it. How a universe which to empirical investigation appears purposeless can also be purposive is especially hard to see. It is clear how a machine, in itself without purpose, can express the purposes of its maker and user ; but pantheism asks us as it were to put purposivity into the machine itself. Apart from the difficulty of seeing how what is mechanical is at the same time inherently purposive, there is difficulty in conceiving the kind of purposivity to be attributed to it. If it

is to be unconscious, there are metaphysical problems in this. If conscious, what is the centre or centres of such consciousness? It can happen that theism appears as a relief from perplexities like these.

Nor is this all. Even if we pass over the difficulty of understanding how the pantheist's universe can have a purpose at all, there is still a difficulty in understanding what its purpose can be. In the present state of knowledge, with the story of the evolution of life on this planet now well known, most people will naturally look there for a clue. But what do we find there? Of all the various qualities and capacities which evolution has thrown up in living things and especially in man, which are to be regarded as the really important ones, for whose sake the whole process has been gone through? What qualities contribute most to survival and further development? A combination of strength and cunning? So Nietzsche would say, and a strong body of opinion with him. Or social co-operation? So says another strong body of opinion, which sees the goal of evolution in a peaceful human society embracing the whole of mankind. But even then we must ask what kind of society it is to be. Is it the bee-hive type, with a closely co-ordinated system of functions and a strict regimentation of its members, where the system is all and the people are made to serve it? Or is it a society where the system serves the individuals, and everything is done to encourage diversity? Which of the types of relationship that can subsist between men is the really central and significant one? Is it the political relation? Or is it the intimate relations which hold between individuals in small groups of friends? Intellectual and spiritual growth seems to be closely bound up with this latter kind of relationship. Is this side of human nature the central fact and value of the whole, or is it a by-product of social and political processes, which must wait upon their convenience? We are not agreed among ourselves about this. But those who find the highest of values in the intellectual and spiritual life and in the most intimate relationships between people will also find that these values are precarious and fragile. If the highest aspirations of man are a clue to the cosmic purpose, as the metaphysical presupposition asserts, should this be so? And wherever in the sphere of life we find

the highest value, we have to face the apparent inevitability of the final destruction of all life by the cooling of the sun.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THEISM

Theism in turn raises problems of its own, of which the chief is to make intelligible the relation between God and the world. I do not mean merely the question of the nature and mode of operation of the divine causality. I mean also the question why God should produce a universe at all. The theory that it emanates from Him by a natural necessity, without His either willing it or being able to help it, cannot be established, because there is no means of showing such a natural necessity. But if not this, the production of the world must be a deliberate act on God's part, and therefore purposive. And if so, what can the purpose be? Merely to exercise power and cunning in giving existence to a world which He then leaves to itself? Even a man can do better than that; he finds the core of his life in his relations with other human beings and with animals, and even treats his material possessions and the works of his hands with a playful pretence of finding in them a personal response. (Personification of ships, etc.) Since God's world contains beings who can at least conceive the possibility of entering into reciprocal relations with Him, it is natural to conclude that He made it so on purpose, and controls its history with the overriding aim of entering into relations with mankind (and with any other such things as may happen to exist: we do not actually know of any others). We are led to think of Him as so fashioning the world that it becomes a means of communication between Him and us, a vehicle by which He teaches and guides us. His purpose must include what is best in ours, but at the highest level of integration, and it is to this that He must be taking us.

No conception of God is really coherent and reasonable unless it goes as far as this. But if it does go so far, it promises to deal with the question of human values more effectively than pantheism could. It centres everything on a relationship which is of the most intimate and personal kind, and which touches each man not by virtue of his social place and function, but of what is most individual and distinctive in him. And it at least

gives us a chance of dealing with the problem of death: for a God Who is distinct from the world may enter into relations with us which lead beyond the present order of space and time. But of this more in detail in our next Supplement.

PERSONAL RELATIONS AT THE HEART OF THINGS

It should be noted that in this last lap the argument has by-passed Anaxagoras and all the Greek tradition of philosophical theism, with its distant and unconcerned God, and has come to a position more akin to that which is associated by tradition with the names of Abraham the Friend of God, and Moses with whom He spoke face to face.

This is of the highest importance; for it means that the only way of applying the metaphysical presupposition satisfactorily to the facts is by a theory which puts personal relationships at the heart of things. We are in a recognizably Judaeo-Christian atmosphere, for it is these two religions above all which have used personality and personal relations as the key to reality, and set up the archetypes of the family, father, children, brethren, etc., in heaven and on earth. We have got away from all purely political hierarchies like Olympus, all impersonal Absolutes and all unconcerned Supreme Intelligences. And what is true in theology must be true also in ethics. We are out of the ambit of moral theories based on self-contained perfection or happiness, though what is true in such theories can be put inside ours; it is for the sake of my brethren in heaven and on earth that I ought to cultivate the virtues which Aristotle analyses so well. We have come beyond the standpoint of all Greek philosophy, though the argument which has brought us here has been throughout a philosophical one.

"God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and the learned." These words have been much advertised ever since they were written, but the correct conclusion has not been drawn from them. They have been used as a jibe at the expense of philosophy, and as such they have been a godsend to theologians and pietists who wished to safeguard their thoughts from rational criticism. But this use of Pascal's words rests on the assumption that the gap which he signalizes

between Christian theology and philosophy is due to something inherent in the nature of philosophy, whereas in fact it is due to the bad management of the philosophers down to and since Pascal's time. The philosophy of the medieval period learned much from Christianity, but not enough. It brought its conclusions into accord with Christian doctrine, and while taking over the fundamental concepts of Greek ontology it gave them a richer and truer meaning by reading the philosophy of being in the light of the word that was spoken from the burning bush. And yet it did not fully understand this word. I AM is not the whole meaning of EHYEH, though it is certainly contained in it. And the concept of being, so transfigured in the light of that word, ceases surely to be a concept of natural reason. The relation between scientific and religious thinking, and between human religion and the light of revelation, is more complex and subtle than mediaeval philosophy was able to grasp. On the other hand, the Reformation protest was over-violent and essentially misdirected. The result should have been not a campaign against philosophy in the interests of "faith", but a deeper analysis of the Christian way of thinking itself, and a re-examination of the great questions in the light of this. It might then have been found that there is built into the foundations of Christianity a philosophy which is deeper and truer, on those points which it touches, than the speculations of the Greeks and their later disciples, and that Philo and his friends were not wholly wrong in saying that Moses had already reached a height in philosophy to which even Plato did not fully rise.

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